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Abstract. Certificate revocation is a challenging task, especially in mobile network environments such as vehicular ad Hoc
networks (VANETs). According to the IEEE 1609.2 security standard for VANETs, public key infrastructure (PKI) will provide
this functionality by means of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). When a certificate authority (CA) needs to revoke a certificate,
it globally distributes CRLs. Transmitting these lists pose a problem as they require high update frequencies and a lot of
bandwidth. In this article, we propose BECSI, a Bandwidth Efficient Certificate Status Information mechanism to efficiently
distribute certificate status information (CSI) in VANETs. By means of Merkle hash trees (MHT), BECSI allows to retrieve
authenticated CSI not only from the infrastructure but also from vehicles acting as mobile repositories. Since these MHTs
are significantly smaller than the CRLs, BECSI reduces the load on the CSI repositories and improves the response time for
the vehicles. Additionally, BECSI improves the freshness of the CSI by combining the use of delta-CRLs with MHTs. Thus,
vehicles that have cached the most current CRL can download delta-CRLs to have a complete list of revoked certificates. Once
a vehicle has the whole list of revoked certificates, it can act as mobile repository.
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1. Introduction
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have recently attracted extensive attentions as a promising tech-
nology for revolutionizing the transportation systems. VANETs consist of entities including On-Board
Units (OBUs) and infrastructure Road-Side Units (RSUs). Mobile nodes are capable of communicat-
ing with each other (i.e. Vehicle to Vehicle Communication -V2V communication) and with the RSUs
(i.e. Vehicle to Infrastructure Communication -V2I communication). Multi-hop communication facili-
tates information exchange among network nodes that are not in direct communication range [3,14], by
means of short range wireless technology based on IEEE 802.11p.
Obviously, any malicious behaviors, such as injecting beacons with false information, modifying and
replaying the previously disseminated messages, could be fatal to the other users. Thus, identifying the
message issuer is mandatory to reduce the risk of such attacks. According to the IEEE 1609.2 stan-
dard [13], vehicular networks will rely on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, a certification
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authority issues an authentic digital certificate for each node in the network. Due to misbehavior, inten-
tional or otherwise, certificates need to be revoked in order to limit the risk that potential misuse poses
to the rest of the network. The IEEE 1609.2 standard [13] states that VANETs will depend on certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) to achieve revocation. CRLs are black lists that enumerate revoked certificates
along with the date of revocation and, optionally, the reasons for revocation.
As VANETs can have a great amount of nodes (i.e. vehicles), CRLs will be large. Moreover, each ve-
hicle in the network will own many temporary certificates (also called pseudonyms) to protect the users’
privacy. Consequently, these lists will require hundreds of Megabytes [12,21,35]. However, distributing
and updating CRLs to all vehicles raises a challenge. If there are no more communication media than
the own VANET, no trusted-third parties (like the corresponding CA) can be assumed to be permanently
available. Thus, online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [28] or, in general, any online solution is not
suitable for this context. Several CRLs distribution protocols have been proposed for this purpose. For
instance, to distribute these lists efficiently, authors in [26] proposed revocation using compressed CRLs.
They divided the CRL into several self-verifiable parts and strongly reduced its size by using Bloom fil-
ters. Authors in [12] also propose the use of Bloom filters to store the revoked certificates for increasing
the search speed in the CRL. On the other hand, authors in [22] proposed to use regional CAs and short
lived certificates to decrease the number of entries in the CRL. We provide more information about these
and other similar proposals in Section 2 but as a general conclusion, we could say that most of the re-
search efforts in this context have been put on trying to reduce the size of the CRL, either trying to split
it or trying to compress it.
In this article, we address the CRL distribution problem by exploiting the combination of three
well-known mechanisms: (1) delta-CRL [1], (2) Merkle hash tree (MHT) [18], and (3) one-way hash
chain [16]. By combining these three mechanisms, we design a Bandwidth Efficient Certificate Status
Information (BECSI) protocol, that allows increasing the availability and freshness of the certificate sta-
tus information (CSI) and at the same time reduces the bandwidth necessary to check the validity of a
given certificate. BECSI takes advantage of V2V communication to create mobile repositories so that
vehicles do not have to rely solely in the RSUs to obtain CSI. We aim to improve the distribution of
CSI by transmitting the revocation information that is unknown to a particular user during the validity
period of a CRL. The main idea behind BECSI is to allow vehicles requesting for new CSI during the
validity period of the current CRL. Thus, revocations that occur during the validity period of the CRL
will not be unknown to the vehicles during this whole validity period, reducing the risk of operating with
an unknown revoked certificate. Therefore, BECSI reduces the peak bandwidth load associated with the
CSI requests as there are more entities in the network that can answer these requests. To achieve, we
combine the issuance of delta-CRLs and MHT.
By using the underlying concept of delta-CRLs, we implement a more efficient way of using of dis-
tributing CSI inside the VANET. To help minimize frequent downloads of lengthy CRLs, delta-CRLs
are published aperiodically. On the other hand, BECSI codes the information included in the CRL and
delta-CRLs in different MHTs. Using these MHTs, vehicles are able to act as mobile repositories. To
achieve that, we embed some little extra information to the CRL such that allows us to create an effi-
cient and secure request/response protocol. In more detail, we propose a way of efficiently embedding
a MHT within the structure of the standard CRL to generate the so-called extended-CRL and extended-
delta-CRL. To create these extended lists, we use an standard way of adding extra information to the
CRL. Our extension contains all the necessary information to allow any vehicle or VANET infrastruc-
ture element that possesses the extended-CRL to build the BECSI tree, i.e., a hash tree with the CSI
of the CRL. Using this BECSI tree, any entity possessing the extended-CRL can act as repository and
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efficiently answer to certificate status checking requests of other vehicles. As we will demonstrate by
simulation, this makes the distribution of CSI more efficient than distributing complete CRLs (even they
are compressed), reducing the data that have to be transmitted over the VANET. We must stress that any
entity possessing an extended-CRL can act as BECSI repository but that a BECSI repository is not a
TTP. In other words, BECSI is offline, which means that no online trusted entity (like a CA) is needed
for authenticating the responses produced by BECSI repositories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the background related to our
mechanism. In Section 3 we describe in depth BECSI. In Section 4, we evaluate the proposed mecha-
nisms. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Background
In this section, first we start describing existing revocation proposals for VANET. Then, we give a brief
overview of Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) [18], which is one of the foundations of the proposed certificate
validation mechanism. Finally we describe the basics of hash chains.
2.1. VANET revocation mechanisms
2.1.1. Centralized revocation approaches
The IEEE 1609.2 standard [13] proposes an architecture based on the existence of a Trusted Third
Party (TTP), which manages the revocation service. In this architecture each vehicle possesses several
short-lived certificates (used as pseudonyms), to ensure users’ privacy. However, short-lived certificates
are not enough as compromised or faulty vehicles could still endanger other vehicles until the end of
their certificate lifetimes. Thus, the IEEE 1609.2 promotes the use of CRLs to manage revocation while
assuming pervasive roadside architecture.
Other proposals in the literature also assume the existence of a TTP to provide the revocation ser-
vice. Raya et al. [25] propose the use of a tamper-proof device (TPD) to store the certificates. A TTP
is in charge of preloading the cryptographic material in the TPD. Thus, when a vehicle is compro-
mised/misbehaving, it can be removed from the network by just revoking the TPD. To that end, the TTP
must include the correspoding revocation information in a CRL. To reduce the bandwidth consumed by
the transmission of CRLs, these authors proposed to compress the CRLs by using Bloom filters. How-
ever, this method gives rise to false positives which degrades the reliability of the revocation service.
However, even compressed, timely distributing CRLs to all vehicles is not trivial. Some authors [22,
23], instead of using a single central authority, have proposed the use of regional certification authori-
ties which must develop some trust relationships. Papadimitratos et al. [24] suggest restricting the scope
of the CRL within a region. Visiting vehicles from other regions require to obtain temporary certifi-
cates. Thus, a vehicle will have to acquire temporary certificates if it is traveling outside its registered
region. The authors also propose breaking the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) into different pieces,
then transmitting these pieces using Fountain or Erasure codes, so that a vehicle can reconstruct the
CRL after receiving a certain number of pieces. Similarly, in [32], each CA distributes the CRL to the
RSUs in its domain through Ethernet. Then, the RSUs broadcast the new CRL to all the vehicles in that
domain. In the case RSUs do not completely cover the domain of a CA, V2V communications are used
to distribute the CRL to all the vehicles [15]. This mechanism is also used in [2,7], where it is detailed
a public key infrastructure mechanism based on bilinear mapping. Revocation is accomplished through
the distribution of CRL that is stored by each user.
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Fig. 1. Sample binary Merkle hash tree.
2.1.2. Decentralized revocation approaches
Decentralized revocation mechanisms provide the revocation service without assuming the existence
of a TTP. Some proposals in the literature divert from the IEEE 1609.2 standard and use online status
checking protocols instead of CRLs to provide a revocation service in a decentralized manner. This is
the case, of the Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust (ADOPT) [17], which uses cached OCSP responses
that are distributed and stored on intermediate nodes. Other group of proposals bases the revocation
service on detecting a vehicle to be misbehaving by a set of other vehicles. Then, the detecting set
may cooperatively revoke the credential of the misbehaving node from their neighborhood. Moore et
al. proposed in [19] a revocation mechanism aiming to prevent an attacker from falsely voting against
legitimate nodes. Raya et al. in [25] proposed a mechanism to temporarily revoke an attacker if the CA
is unavailable. To do so, the number of accusing neighbor users must exceed a threshold. A similar
mechanism based also on vehicle voting is proposed in [34]. Again, by means of a voting scheme, a
vehicle can be marked as misbehaving and then be revoked by its neighbors.
Another proposal uses a game-theoretic revocation approach to define the best strategy for each in-
dividual vehicle [5,27]. These mechanisms provide incentives to guarantee the successful revocation of
the malicious nodes. Moreover, thanks to the records of past behavior, the mechanism is able to dynam-
ically adapt the parameters to nodes’ reputations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium on-the-fly,
minimizing the cost of the revocation.
Finally, there are some hybrid approaches that are neither totally centralized nor decentralized [10,33].
For instance, authors in [9] propose the use of authenticated data structures to issue CSI. Using these
schemes, the revocation service is decentralized to transmit the CSI but still depends on a CA to decide
when a node should be evicted from the VANET.
2.2. The Merkle hash tree
A Merkle hash tree (MHT) [18] is essentially a tree structure that is built with a One Way Hash
Function (OWHF). The leaf nodes hold the hash values of the data of interest (data1,data2,. . . ) and
the internal nodes hold the hash values that result from applying the OWHF to the concatenation of the
hash values of its children nodes. In this way, a large number of separate data can be tied to a single
hash value: the hash at the root node of the tree. MHTs can be used to provide an efficient and highly-
scalable way to distribute revocation information, as it is described in [8] for MANETs (Mobile Ad Hoc
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Networks). A sample MHT is presented in Fig. 1. This hash tree is binary because each node has at most
two children or equivalently, two sibling nodes are combined to form a parent node in the next level. We
will call these siblings as “left” and “right” and a detailed explanation of how to build the hash tree for
BECSI is given in Section 3.3.
A MHT relies on the properties of the One Way Hash Functions (OWHF). It exploits the fact that an
OWHF is at least 10,000 times faster to compute than a digital signature, so the majority of the crypto-
graphic operations performed in the revocation system are hash functions instead of digital signatures.
In addition, by storing the internal node values, it is possible to verify that any of the leaf nodes is part
of the tree without revealing any of the other data.
2.3. Hash chains
The idea of “hash chain” was first proposed by Lamport [16] in 1981 and suggested to be used for
safeguarding against password eavesdropping. A hash chain C is a set of values s0, . . ., sn for n ∈ Z
such that si = h(si−1) for some one-way hash function h, where i ∈ [1, n] and s0 is a valid input for h.
Note that hash chains are preimage resistent, i.e., by knowing si, si−1 cannot be generated by those
who do not know the value s0, however given si−1, its correctness can be verified by hashing h(si). This
property of hash chains has evolved from the property of one-way hash functions. Additionally, hash
chains are also second preimage resistent, collision resistent and generate pseudo-random numbers.
In most of the hash-chain applications, first sn is securely distributed and then the elements of the
hash chain are spent (or used) one by one by starting from si−1 and continuing until the value of s0 is
reached. At this point the hash chain is said to be exhausted and the whole process should be repeated
again with a different seed to reinitialize the systems.
3. BECSI: Bandwidth efficient certificate status information distribution mechanism
In this Section, we present BECSI, a bandwidth efficient mechanism for certificate status checking
over VANETs based on the use of Merkle Hash Trees and hash chains. First we introduce the motivation,
goal and security architecture needed to support BECSI, and next we describe the mechanism in depth.
3.1. Motivation and goal
Despite the short-comings related to propagation of revocation information, the need for trusted au-
thorities like CAs to ensure authentication has motivated researchers to propose PKI based security for
vehicular networks. Mainly, these mechanisms intend to provide the following set of requirements:
1. Reliability: The revocation service must be available at all times.
2. Memory: Minimum amount of memory should be required as validation is often carried out in
constrained environments.
3. Bandwidth: Communication bandwidth should be minimal.
4. Freshness: Revocation data should be as updated as possible.
Proposals described in Section 2 mainly deal with the bandwidth requirement. By compressing the
CRL, using state-of-the-art coding techniques or partitioning the CRL, these approaches reduce the
time required to download CSI. In addition, authors intend to provide a reliable revocation service by
decentralizing the CSI distribution points. However, none of these works deals with the freshness of
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Fig. 2. System architecture.
the CSI. With BECSI we aim not only to reduce the communication overhead but also to increase the
availability and freshness of CSI while keeping a reasonable computation cost.
CRLs are normally published in intervals meaning that there will not be any new revocation informa-
tion available between the issuance and the update of the CRL. Newer revocations will thus be delayed
until the next update occurs. High-security applications (e.g. safety applications) cannot cope with this
lack of fresh information and render the traditional CRL approach almost useless in VANETs. To solve
these problems, BECSI includes an extension to the standard CRL that allows RSUs to act as an offline
repositories. Thus vehicles do not have to download the whole extended CRL, and they can just query
about the status of a particular certificate.
3.2. Security architecture
The security architecture is an adaptation of a mesh PKI system to a vehicular scenario constructed of
peer-to-peer CA relationships. This architecture consists of 4 different types of nodes (see Fig. 2):
1. Certification authorities: CAs are responsible for holding and managing the credentials and iden-
tities of all the vehicles which are registered under its hood. CAs are responsible for generating the
set of certificates that are stored in each OBU. They are also responsible for managing the revoca-
tion information and making it accessible to the rest of the entities. By definition of TTP, the CA
should be considered fully trusted by all the network entities, so it should be assumed that it cannot
be compromised by any attacker. In fact, in our proposal CAs are the only trusted entities within
the network.
2. Road-side units: RSUs are fixed entities that are fully controlled by the CA. They can access the
CA anytime because they are located in the infrastructure-side, which does not suffer from discon-
nections. If the CA considers that an RSU has been compromised, the CA can revoke it.
3. Vehicles: They are the clients of the network. They have their cryptographic material stored in a
TPD. Vehicles can check the validity of a certificate using V2I or V2V.
4. Mobile repositories: Mobile repositories are vehicles that have previously downloaded the
CRL/delta-CRLs and are willing to response to certificate status requests from other vehicles.
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Fig. 3. Sample BECSI base-tree.
3.3. BECSI tree
In this section, we introduce the data structure that BECSI uses to handle the revocation service. In
this sense, we define the BECSI tree as a composite Merkle Hash Tree (see Section 2). This tree consists
of:
– A base-tree which is constructed using the serial number of the revoked certificates contained in the
base-CRL.
– A set of Δ-trees which are constructed from the serial number of the certificates that are revoked
during the validity interval of the base-CRL, i.e, they are constructed from the data contained in the
delta-CRLs.
3.3.1. BECSI base-tree
The base-tree is a binary hash tree where each node represents a revoked certificate that is contained in
the base-CRL. We denote by Ni,j the nodes within the BECSI base-tree, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} rep-
resent respectively the i-th level and the j-th node in the i-th level. We denote byHi,j the cryptographic
(hash) value stored by node Ni,j (see Fig. 3).
We denote by Ni,j the nodes within the MHT where i and j represent respectively the i-th level and
the j-th node. We denote byHi,j the cryptographic variable stored by nodeNi,j .
Nodes at level 0 are called “leaves” and they represent the data stored in the tree. In the case of
revocation, leaves represent the set Φ of certificates that have been revoked,
Φ = {c0, c1, . . . , cj , . . . , cn} . (1)
Where cj is the data stored by leaf N0,j . Then,H0,j is computed as:
H0,j = h(cj) , (2)
where h is a OWHF.
To build the MHT, a set of t adjacent nodes at a given level i (Ni,j ,Ni,j+1, . . . ,Ni,j+t−1) are combined
into one node in the upper level, which we denote by Ni+1,k. Then,Hi+1,k is obtained by applying h to
the concatenation of the t cryptographic variables:
Hi+1,k = h(Hi,j|Hi,j+1| . . . |Hi,j+t−1). (3)
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At the top level there is only one node called the “root”.Hroot is a digest for all the data stored in the
MHT.
The sample MHT of Fig. 1 is a binary tree because adjacent nodes are combined in pairs to form a
node in the next level (t = 2) andHroot = H2,0.
We define the Digest as the concatenation of the certification authority distinguished number, the root
hash and the validity period of the certificate status data. Once created, the Digest is signed by the CA.
Digestbase = {DNCA,Hroot,Validity Period}SIGCA .
We denote as the Pathcj as the set of cryptographic values necessary to compute Hroot from the leaf
cj .
It is worth noting that Digest is trusted data because it is signed by the CA and it is unique within the
tree while Path is different for each leaf. Thus, If the MHT provides a response with the proper Pathcj
and the MHT Digest, any vehicle can verify whether cj ∈ Φ.
For instance, let us suppose that a certain user wants to find out whether c1 belongs to the sample
MHT of Fig. 1. Then,
Pathc1 = {H0,0,H1,1},
Digest = {DNCA,H2,0,Validity Period}SIGCA .
The response verification consists in checking thatH2,0 computed from the Pc1 matchesH2,0 included
in the Digest:
Hroot = H2,0 = h(h(h(c1)|H0,0)|H1,1) .
Note that the BECSI base-tree can be built by a trusted third party (e.g. a CA) and distributed to a
non-TTP because a leaf cannot be added or deleted to Φ without modifying Hroot, which is included in
the Digest and as the Digest is signed, it cannot be forged by a non-TTP. To do such a thing, an attacker
would need to find a pre-image of a OWHF which is computationally infeasible by definition.
3.3.2. BECSIΔ-trees
BECSI Δ-trees are constructed in the same way that the base-tree. However they present two differ-
ences with respect to the base-tree:
– Each leaf of the Δ-trees refers to certificates that were revoked during the validity interval of the
base-CRL.
– The root of theΔ-tree is calculated by hashing the top-hash of the tree with the corresponding value
of a hash chain. For more details about the construction of the hash chain see Section 3.4.3.
Figure 4 shows the simplest possibleΔ-tree which contains only two revoked certificates.
Note that theseΔ-trees have the same properties that the base-tree, so that the root node is unique and
cannot be forged. Thus, the Digest is composed as:
DigestΔi = {DNCA,H iΔroot,Validity Period}SIGCA .
Similarly, the Path consist of the set of cryptographic values necessary to compute H iΔroot from the
leaf cj . Note that this path is shorter in the case of the leafs of the Δ-trees because they contain less
revoked certificates than the base-tree. The length of the Δ-trees is fixed as they are constructed from
the delta-CRLs that have fixed size.
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Fig. 4. Sample BECSIΔ-tree.
3.4. Operating mode
BECSI consists in four phases. During the first phase of Bootstraping, the CA creates the “extended-
CRL”, that is, a CRL in which a signed extension is appended. This extension will allow non-trusted
third parties (non-TTP) to answer CSI requests in an off-line way when required. Once this extended-
CRL has been constructed, it is distributed to the RSUs. In the second phase of Repository Creation,
a non-trusted entity (i.e. a RSU or a vehicle) gets the extended-CRL and becomes a CSI repository for
other VANET entities. Next, during the third phase CSI Update, the CA creates “extended-delta-CRLs”
of fixed size. A delta-CRL is a time-stamped digitally signed revocation list containing information
about new revocations that occurred since the issuance of a prior base-CRL.1 To construct these fixed-
size delta-CRLs, the CA has to wait to have enough new revoked certificates. Therefore, the issuance of
these delta-CRLs is aperiodic. Once, the delta-CRL is constructed, the CA appends a signed extension
corresponding to the root node of the Δ-tree. The extended-delta-CRLs are distributed to the RSUs and
mobile repositories. Moreover, the CA broadcasts the number of issued extended-delta-CRLs to avoid
CSI suppression attacks. Finally, in the fourth stage of Certificate Status Checking, vehicles can use an
efficient protocol to obtain the CSI from any available VANET repository. Henceforward, we give a
more detailed description of these three stages.
3.4.1. Bootstraping
In this first phase, the CA creates the extended-CRL and delivers it to the RSUs. An extended-CRL
is basically a standard CRL with an appended extension. This extension can be used by non-TTP (e.g.
RSUs and vehicles inside the VANET) to act as repositories and answer to CSI requests. All the tasks of
this system initialization are performed in the CA locally.
These are the steps that the CA must carry out:
1. The CA creates a tbs-CRL (to be signed CRL), i.e., a list including the serial number of the cer-
tificates that have been revoked (along with the date of revocation), the identity of the CA, some
time-stamps to establish the validity period, etc.
2. The CA creates the BECSI base-tree, i.e., a MHT constructed with the serial numbers within the
previous tbs-CRL as leaves of the tree. The BECSI base-tree is a binary tree, and is constructed
following the methodology explained in Section 3.3. The leaves of the base-tree are ordered by
1A base-CRL is a complete CRL that contains a complete list of revoked certificates, to which the revocation list in the delta-
CRL needs to be applied to produce the latest list of revoked certificates. Base and delta CRLs have similar data structures.
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increasing serial number. Therefore, the bottom left leaf stores the revoked certificate with lowest
serial number. Note that if the BECSI base-tree is formed by an odd number n of leaves, there is a
leaf N0,n−1 that does not have a pair. Then the single node is simply carried forward to the upper
level by hashing its H0,n−1 value. We proceed in the same way if any i-th level is formed by an
odd number n of nodes. Once created the MHT, the CA obtains the root hash.
3. The CA calculates the extension, which consists basically of the Digest and the last value U0 of a
hash chain. The hash chain will be used to make users aware of the number of issued delta-CRLs.
Recall that the Digest is calculated as the concatenation of the CA distinguished number, the root
hash of the base-tree and the validity period of the CSI, and after that signed by the CA. Obviously,
the distinguished number and the validity period should be the same than the ones contained in the
tbs-CRL. In fact, the BECSI base-tree is just a different way of representing the CSI, but the hash
tree will be valid during the same time and will provide the same information than the CRL. Once
calculated, this Digest is appended to the tbs-CRL.
4. The CA creates the hash chain. To that end, the CA picks a random value for Ud. By hashing
this value iteratively, the CA forms a one-way chain of self-authenticating values, and assigns the
values sequentially to the time intervals (one value per delta-CRL). The last value of the chain U0
is appended to the tbs-CRL along with the Digest, generating the tbs-extended-CRL.
5. The CA signs the tbs-extended-CRL, generating the extended-CRL. Notice that this second overall
signature not only authenticates all the CSI, but also binds this CSI to the Digest. The extended-
CRL is only slightly larger than the standard CRL, as we will show later in Section 4.
6. Finally, the CA distributes copies of the extended-CRL to the designated RSUs, which will act as
the typical PKI repositories, in the same manner as they would do with a standard CRL.
After this first phase, the RSUs have a copy of the extended-CRL, which contains exactly the same
CSI than a standard CRL and it is valid for the same time. The advantage of an extended-CRL is that any
non-TTP in possession of it can generate again the BECSI base-tree locally, and obtain the root hash. As
the extended-CRL also includes the Digest, which is signed by the CA, this entity has an authenticated
version of the BECSI base-tree and can answer to CSI requests in an off-line way.
3.4.2. CSI repositories creation
In this phase, RSUs and freewill vehicles become new CSI repositories of the VANET. Vehicles that
become mobile repositories allow the distribution of CSI in areas with poor coverage. To become a
repository an entity must follow the following steps:
1. The entity obtains the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) either from the CA or from an-
other entity that has an up-to-date copy of the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) in its
cache. Notice that the CA uses a secure wireline to communicate with the RSUs, while the RSUs
use a wireless link to communicate with the vehicles.
2. Once the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) has been downloaded, the entity verifies that
the signature of the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) is valid and corresponds to the CA.
If so, the entity generates locally the BECSI base-tree (andΔ-trees) using the serial numbers within
the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) and following the same algorithm than the CA (as
explained in Section 3.3). The root hash of the tree created from the extended-CRL (and extended-
delta-CRLs) entries must match the signed root value contained in the Digestbase (and DigestΔi).
3. At this moment, the entity can respond to any status checking request from any vehicle until the
correspondingDigest expires.
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Fig. 5. Delta-CRLs issuance scheduling.
Fig. 6. CCH/SCH timing.
3.4.3. CSI update
After the first two phases, any entity of the VANET is capable of downloading the CRL from a repos-
itory or it can just check the status of a given certificate using the capabilities of a MHT. However,
in order to improve the freshness of the revocation information and avoid potential bottlenecks when
obtaining new CSI, BECSI also provides CSI updates during the validity interval of the CRL.
To alleviate high CRL distribution costs, BECSI uses a hybrid delta-CRL scheme. BECSI issues a
variable number of delta-CRLs during the validity interval of the base CRLs (as shown in Fig. 5), reduc-
ing the total bandwidth load on the CRL distribution points (RSU and mobile repositories). The size of
these delta-CRLs is fixed a priori by the CA. Consequently, the number of delta-CRLs issued during the
validity interval of the base-CRL depends on the number of revoked certificates during this interval.
To ensure that any vehicle entity is aware of the number of issued delta-CRLs, the CA discloses a
value Ui of a hash chain each time a new delta-CRL is issued. This hash value allows users to make sure
of how many Δ-trees have been published by the CA. Thus a non-TTP cannot lie about the amount of
revocation information that has been published. Note that the corresponding valueUi is used to calculate
the root value of the Δ-tree, binding the Δ-tree to the Ui. BECSI takes advantage of the physical layer
used in VANETs to transmit the hash value Ui to vehicles.
The physical layer in VANETs is based on the Dedicated short range communication (DSRC) proto-
col [14]. DSRC is a 75 MHz band in the 5.9 GHz frequency range with seven non-overlapping channels.
Two different channel types are described for use in DSRC. The first type is the control channel, re-
ferred to as CCH, which is a single channel reserved for short, high-priority application and system
control messages [13]. During the CCH, every node broadcasts a beacon that provides trajectory and
other information about the vehicle. The other type of channel is the service channel, or SCH, which
has six different 10 MHz channels that support a wider range of applications and data transfer. During
CCH time channel activities on SCH are suspended and vice versa. BECSI uses the CCH to transmit
the corresponding Ui. Each node in the VANET monitors the CCH during time periods designated as
control channel intervals. The time period for an entire CCH Interval and SCH Interval is called a Sync
Interval (see Fig. 6). Between CCH intervals, nodes may switch to participate on a SCH for applications
such as file downloads [21].
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Each regional CA sends to RSUs an authenticated messageM containing the corresponding Ui and a
time-stamp.
CA → RSUs : M = [Ui,Time Stamp]SignCA
Note that regional CAs are expected to have a wireline to communicate with their corresponding RSUs.
The time stamp included in the message allows vehicles to verify the freshness of the message. Thus, it
is avoided potential forgery or replay attacks. The size of this message is 72 bytes:
– 64 bytes for the ECDSA-256 CA’s signature.
– 4 bytes for the timestamp representing seconds UTC since the epoch (’1970-01-01 00:00:00’ UTC).
– 4 bytes for representing the Ui value.
During the CCH interval, RSUs broadcast this message to OBUs in range. However, not in every CCH
interval M is sent. Depending on the certificate revocation rate, each regional CA will choose the rate
at which they have to transmit the Ui to the vehicles. Normally, vehicles will remain under the coverage
of an RSU for more than 100 ms. Therefore, CAs have to adjust the frequency at which M is sent to
avoid vehicles receiving multiple copies of the same message. Notice that as M is signed by the CA,
any vehicle can act as repository and transmit this message without being able to modify it. The hash
chain is initialized with secret nonce that the CA generates (Ud) and includes in the extended-CRL. By
hashing Ud, the other Ui nodes of the chain are calculated. As the validity interval of the CRL is finite,
the length of the chain is also finite, i.e., U0 is the last node of the chain that is calculated after hashing
d times Ud. Thus each value can be calculated applying a hash function h to the previous value, and the
first value of the hash chain is the secret nonce Ud.
Ud
h→ Ud−1 h→ . . . h→ Ui h→ U2 h→ U1 h→ U0
On the other hand, BECSI not only issues delta-CRLs aperiodically, it also includes an extension in
the delta-CRLs as it does with the base-CRL. Thus, any VANET entity that has cached the extended-
delta-CRL can construct the BECSI Δ-tree (as shown in Section 2.2). With this MHT, a non-TTP can
respond to any entity requesting the status of a particular certificate. The response can be authenticated
by the requesting party by means of the extension.
3.4.4. Certificate status checking
After the third phase, RSUs and some vehicles will be able to act as repositories. The last stage of the
mechanism consists in providing the certificate status information to any vehicle that needs to validate
the status of a certificate. Under BECSI, vehicles have to option to check the status of a certificate:
– Downloading the standard CRL and the available delta-CRLs from any repository. This option is
desirable when the connectivity to the infrastructure is high and the network congestion is low. For
instance, in a urban scenario during non-rush hours where the deployed infrastructure should be
enough to serve the CSI.
– Requesting the status of a particular certificate to any repository. With this option, the requesting
vehicle only gets the status of a single certificate, so the bandwidth load is low. Vehicles should
use this option when they need a quick response (e.g. authenticating safety messages), or when the
VANET conditions are not good enough to download the whole CRL and delta-CRLs.
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Independently of the option, vehicles that need to check the status of a certificate must locate a valid
repository. To do so, vehicles use a Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) to find a RSU or a vehicle that is
acting as repository. Once the repository has been located, the vehicles can query for the CRL or query
for the status of a particular certificate using the following status checking protocol.
The protocol for status information exchange is based on the hash tree structure and it allows checking
the integrity of a single extended-CRL or extended-delta-CRL entry with only some hash material plus
the Digest (included in the extension) and the corresponding Ui. On the one hand, this is much more
efficient than broadcasting the entire extended-CRL and the extended-delta-CRLs. On the other hand, the
mechanism is fully offline (the only trusted authority is the CA), which is a very good feature because
sometimes it may be impossible for vehicles to reach the CA due to lack of coverage.
Hence, a vehicle that needs to check the status of a certificate must follow the next steps:
1. The vehicle uses a service discovery protocol to find either a RSU or a mobile repository inside its
coverage range for status checking.
2. The vehicle sends the serial number of the certificate that is going to be verified to the repository.
The repository searches the target certificate in the base-tree and the Δ-trees. In the case the cer-
tificate is found, the repository sends the Path, i.e., the hash values of the nodes of the base-tree
(or Δ-tree) which are needed to calculate the signed root. To calculate the path, the repository fol-
lows a recursive algorithm that starts from the root and goes across the MHT until the target leaf is
reached (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to calculate the Path of a given certificate.
Input: SNtarget
Output: Path
foreach base-tree andΔ-treei do





while Nij.max = Nij.min do
i = i− 1
j = 2 · j
if Nij .max < SNtarget then
Path.add(Nij)




3. The vehicle verifies that the Hroot (or the H iroot) calculated from the Path matches the Hroot (or
theH iroot) contained in the Digestbase (or the DigestΔi).
Notice that as allHroot and all Digests are signed by the CA, it is just as impractical to create falsified
values of the Path as it is to break a strong hash function. In case the certificate is not revoked, the
repository sends the adjacent leaves to the requested certificate. To this respect, the repository has to
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prove that a certain certificate (SNtarget) does not belong to the set of revoked certificates (Φ). To prove
that SNtarget /∈ Φ, as the leaves are ordered, it is enough to demonstrate the existence of two leaves, a
minor adjacent (SNminor) and a major adjacent (SNmajor) for the base-tree and eachΔ-tree that fulfill:
1. SNmajor ∈ Φ.
2. SNminor ∈ Φ.
3. SNminor < SNtarget < SNmajor.
4. SNminor and SNmajor are adjacent nodes.
So in the worst case, where d delta-CRLs have been published, the repository will have to send 2d + 1
Paths to proof that a certificate is not revoked, i.e, the serial number is not contained neither in the
base-CRL nor in the delta-CRLs. Note that in any case, the amount of data necessary to proof that is
smaller than the whole CRL. Therefore, checking vehicles have to know exactly the number of published
Δ-trees, i.e., to check that a certificate is not revoked it must corroborate that it does not belong to any
MHT. In any case, the data that the repository needs to send to a node to perform the status checking can
be placed in a single UDP datagram using 802.11p link-layer.
4. Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed status checking protocol and we compare it
with other certificates status management protocols designed for VANET. First, we define a set of metrics
to compare the performance of revocation schemes. Then, BECSI is evaluated through simulation using
NCTUns [31]. NCTUns was chosen for its advanced IEEE 802.11 model library and ability to integrate
with any Linux networking tools.
4.1. Comparison criteria
– Query Cost (Qcost): This criterion measures the cost of certificate validity checking. The cost repre-
sents bandwidth requirement from repositories to vehicles. Therefore, we calculate this cost as the
size of a CSI query (sq) plus the size of its response (sr):
Qcost = sq + sr. (4)
– Request Ratio: This metric captures the amount of requests that the VANET entities perform to
update the CSI. If client validation requests arrive independent of each other, an exponential inter-




whereNveh is the total number of vehicles in the VANET and λ is the ratio of certificates validated
per day by each vehicle.
– Window of vulnerability (WOV): This criterion captures the risk of operating with cached CSI.
It indicates how long the new revocation data might be held by CAs before being distributed to
vehicles. In this paper, WOV is measured in number of hours, which is reasonable because typically
CRLs are normally updated every day. We estimate the WOV not only taking into account the
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Table 1
Comparison of the overhead introduced by BECSI and other
certificate validation mechanisms
Mechanism Request size Response size Query Cost
CRL 73 bytes 145 Mbytes ∼145 Mbytes
Compressed CRL 73 bytes 10 Mbytes ∼10 Mbytes
(Bloom Filter-2%
false positives)
ADOPT 66 bytes 586 bytes 652 bytes
BECSI tree 73 bytes 725 bytes 778 bytes
CRL Header (∼ 50 bytes)
– Issuer’s name: 32 bytes (if X.500 name used)
– CRL issuance time (thisUpdate): 6 bytes
– Next CRL issuance time (nextUpdate): 6 bytes
List of revoked certificates (9 bytes per revoked certifi-
cate)
– Serial number : 3 bytes
– Revocation date : 6 bytes
– CRL entry extensions (e.g. revocation reason)
CRL general extensions (e.g. CRL Number)
Signature of CRL issuer (64 bytes for ECDSA-256 bit)
Fig. 7. Key elements of X.509 v2 CRL.
validity interval of issued CSI but also the ratio of unknown revoked certificates during this interval
as in [20]. Thus,
WOV (t) =
ρ(t− t0)
(1− ρ)Tc + ρ(t− t0) , (6)
where Tc is the mean certificate lifetime, ρ is the revocation ratio of revoked certificates, and t0 is
the issuing instant of the CSI.
– Scalability: This criterion shows how a revocation mechanism scales in large VANETs, measured
as the ratio of increased costs (in terms of update and query costs) over increased size of the ve-
hicles (measured in the number of certificates, queries and revoked certificates). If we assume a
stable certificate revocation rate and query rate, a larger VANET typically indicates more revoked
certificates and queries in unit time.
4.2. Analytical evaluation
In this section, we compare analytically the performance of BECSI to other certificate status valida-
tion mechanisms. To that end, we compare BECSI with these mechanisms in terms of aforementioned
metrics.
4.2.1. Query cost analysis
First of all, we start estimating the size of a CRL in a vehicular environment.
Figure 7 describes the size of each of the elements that compose a CRL. Note that, in a VANET, the
size of the CRL will depend mainly on the number of revoked certificates, so that the size of the CRL
header is negligible compared to the total size of the CRL. Let Nveh be the total number of vehicles
in the region that the CRL needs to cover, ρ the average percentage of certificates revoked, Lf the
lifetime of a certificate, and s¯ the mean number of pseudonyms of a vehicle. Additionally, let Nrev
be the number of non-expired certificates that were revoked, i.e., the number of certificates that the
CRL contains. According to [30], the probability of a certificate being revoked follows an exponential
distribution. Then, the probability of a given certificate to become revoked at any time period of its
lifetime i ∈ [0, . . . , Lf ] can be expressed as:
Prev(i) = Lfe
−i·Lf .
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When a certificate is revoked at time period i of its lifetime, it stays in the CRL for Lf−i time periods.
Thus, the expected time a revoked certificate stays in the CRL can be estimated as:






Then, we can estimate the mean number of revoked certificates in a CRL as:
Nrev = Nveh · ρ · s¯ · Lf .
Finally, we estimate the size of a CRL in a VANET. As shown in Fig. 7, CRL entries will have varying
sizes, but according to 1609.2 standard [13], 14 bytes per entry is a realistic figure, i.e, se = 14 bytes.
The size of the CRL header is negligible compared to the total size of the CRL. According to NIST
statistics [4], 10% of the certificates need to be revoked during a year, i.e., ρ = 0.1. Recall that in a
VANET, each vehicle owes not only an identity certificate, but also several pseudonyms. The number of
pseudonymsmay vary depending on the degree of privacy and anonymity that it must be guaranteed. Ac-
cording to Raya, Papadimitratos, and Hubaux in [26] the OBU must store enough pseudonyms to change
pseudonyms about every minute while driving. This equates to about 43,800 pseudonyms per year for
an average of two hours of driving per day [21]. Haas, Hu, and Laberteaux in [11] recommend changing
pseudonyms every 10 minutes, and driving 15 hours per week. This equates to 4,660 pseudonyms per
year, but they recommend storing five years of pseudonyms for a total of about 25,000 pseudonyms per
OBU. Therefore, we set s¯ = 25, 000. Regarding to the certificate lifetime, according to [30], it ranges
from 26 to 37 days. In this manner, we set the lifetime to 1 month. Therefore, the expected CRL size is:
CRLsize = Nrev · se = Nveh · ρ · s¯ · Lf · se
Assuming that a regional certification authority manages a very short population of around 50,000 ve-
hicles, the expected CRL size is CRLsize  145 Mbytes.
On the other hand, the response size of BECSI (when using the MHTs to generate authenticated re-
sponses) is much smaller than a CRL as it consists only of theDigest and the Path for a given certificate.
Using the SHA-1 algorithm (hash size of 160 bits), and ECDSA-256 the size of the response of BECSI
for 10,000,000 revoked certificates (including pseudonyms) is of approximately 725 bytes.
In terms of the total overhead introduced to the network, Table 1 shows the Query Cost for current
proposed certificate validation mechanisms. Note that the request size is very similar for all the mech-
anisms. However, the size of the response varies significantly, e.g., BECSI and ADOPT response sizes
are six orders of magnitude smaller than conventional CRL. Figure 8 shows the size of the response for
CRL, Compressed CRL, ADOPT [17] and BECSI depending on the number of revoked vehicles in the
network. While ADOPT response size is constant, the size of the response when using CRL or a com-
pressed version of the CRL increments with the number of revoked certificates. Notice that, the CRL size
grows linearly with the number of revoked certificates, while BECSI response sizes describe a logarith-
mic growth. Therefore, in terms of Query Cost, BECSI is more efficient than CRL and the compressed
CRL. Regarding ADOPT, its response size is slightly smaller than in BECSI, but it lacks of the benefits
that BECSI provides to operate during disconnections. ADOPT relies on the fact that any vehicle stores
the previously received CSI responses. In vehicular scenarios the number of cached responses could be
huge, and therefore, also a huge storage capacity is required in the vehicle. In addition, ADOPT does not
guarantee that a vehicle obtains the status of a given certificate when needed. So, ADOPT has smaller
responses, but it does not provide as fresh information as BECSI, it forces VANET nodes to store a large
amount of CSI data and finally, it makes the network more vulnerable due to the potential unavailability
of required CSI.
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Fig. 8. Response size vs. number of vehicles.
Fig. 9. Request rate for different revocation mechanisms.
4.2.2. Request ratio analysis
In the traditional method of certificate revocation, each CRL includes a nextUpdate field that specifies
the time at which the next CRL will be issued. Thus, once a relying party has obtained a CRL in order to
perform a validation, it will not need to request any further information from the repository to perform
future validations until the time specified in the nextUpdate field of the CRL in its cache has been
reached. So, during the period of time in which a CRL is valid (i.e., the most current), each relying party
will make at most one request to the repository for revocation information. This request will be made the
first time after the current CRL is issued that the relying party performs a validation. Thus, the request
ratio of the CRL decreases during the validity interval of the CRL following an exponential function (see
Fig. 9). Figure 9 shows the request rate for a CRL, issued using the traditional method, over the course
of 24 hours. The graph in this figure was drawn assuming that a CRL was issued at time 0 and that no
other CRLs were issued during the period of time shown in the graph. It was also assumed that there are
50,000 vehicles each validating an average of 10 certificates per day.
Figure 9 shows also an example of delta-CRLs issued in the traditional manner. In this example,
vehicles download base CRLs at most once every 24 hours. Delta-CRLs are then obtained to ensure that
validations are based on certificate status information that is at most 1 hour old. Each validation will
require access to a delta-CRL and its corresponding base CRL (either downloaded from the repository
or generated locally from a delta-CRL and a previous base CRL). So, the request rate for delta-CRLs
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will be the same as the request rate for full CRLs in a system that does not use delta-CRLs. Base CRLs,
on the other hand, will be downloaded less frequently.
Finally, regarding the cases of BECSI and ADOPT, the request rate is almost constant, i.e., every time
a vehicle needs to check the status of a particular certificate they must query a repository. Note that this
rate decreases with time, as vehicles also have the ability to store previously queried CSI. However, as
the number of valid certificates is so large in VANETs, this decrement is imperceptible.
4.2.3. WOV analysis
The window of vulnerability (WOV) affects update and query bandwidth requirements and/or repos-
itories processing loads directly, while these two factors are two major features determining scalability
of CSI issuing mechanisms. WOV presents a direct tradeoff between the security/ timeliness and system
scalability. No window of vulnerability means high security and is thus desirable; however, it requires
either timely certificate status update from CAs that can force a high update cost and incur security risk.
The traditional way of issuing CRL is the worst mechanism in terms of WOV. During the whole
validity of the CRL, vehicles are unaware of new revoked certificates. Therefore, the WOV will increase
during the validity of the CRL as there will be more unknown revoked certificates as times goes by.
Figure 10 shows the WOV for a CRL issued periodically each 24 hours, and with a constant revocation
rate ρ = 0.1. Note that the revocation rate determines the slope of the function, i.e., higher revocation
rate will give higher WOV.
Compressed CRLs have the same WOV that the standard CRL as they are just a compressed version
of the CRL issued with the same lifetime. In the same way, ADOPT also has the same WOV that a
CRL. ADOPT presents a distributed mechanism that takes advantages of V2V communications to issue
cached CSI. However, the CSI source of this cached revocation information is a CRL. Therefore, the
validity period of the cached information in ADOPT is the same that the validity period of the source
CRL, i.e., the WOV is the same.
Figure 10 also shows the WOV for BECSI and delta-CRLs. Note that both mechanisms improve the
WOV. Traditional delta-CRLs reduce the WOV as they are issued periodically during the validity of
the base-CRL. Therefore, the interval of vulnerability of the base-CRL is reduced as many times as
delta-CRLs are issued during the lifetime of the base-CRL. In the example shown in the figure, for each
base-CRL issued each day, a delta-CRL is issued each 2.4 hours. Thus, 10 delta-CRLs are issued during
the validity interval of the base-CRL, reducing the WOV ten times.
In the same way, BECSI also uses delta-CRLs to construct the tree structure. Therefore, the tree
structures used in such scheme reduces not only update or query costs, but also the WOV. Recall that
BECSI does not issue delta-CRLs periodically, but these are issued with a fixed size. In this sense,
despite that fact that the WOV could be higher than with the traditional delta-CRL issuing mechanism,
the maximum WOV is always constant. Thus CAs can manage the WOV by selecting the size of the
delta-CRLs. In the example shown in the Fig. 10, the number of delta-CRLs issued during the validity
interval of the base-CRL is reduced compared to the traditional delta-CRL issuing mechanisms. Note
that in this example, BECSI’s WOV is never higher than 0.0005.
4.2.4. Scalability analysis
When the vehicular population is large, CRLs tend to become large imposing high bandwidth costs on
the CRL distribution points. Hence traditional CRL-based schemes do not scale well. If clients have lim-
ited bandwidth capability as is the case of the 802.11p, downloading large CRLs will be user-unfriendly.
With traditional delta-CRLs, the base-CRLs are issued less frequently (as shown in Fig. 5), this re-
ducing the total bandwidth load on the CRL distribution points. However, that use of the traditional
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Fig. 10. WOV for different revocation mechanisms.
delta-CRL does not lead to a significant reduction in bandwidth as one would expect. If delta-CRLs are
issued very frequently, there is no advantage in using traditional delta-CRLs. Therefore, although the
scalability improves compared to simple CRLs mechanisms, traditional delta-CRLs scalability depends
on the issuing periodicity of the delta-CRLs.
BECSI takes advantage of the delta-CRLs and optimize the issuing interval so that delta-CRLs remain
constant in size. With BECSI, delta-CRLs always have the same size, but they are issued aperiodically.
Thus, BECSI becomes more scalable than traditional delta-CRL where depending on the revocation
rate the issuing period of the delta-CRLs could be bandwidth-inefficient. Moreover, BECSI also takes
advantage of the capabilities of the V2V communication, allowing any vehicle in the network to become
a mobile repository. In this sense, BECSI (as ADOPT), multiplies the number of potential repositories,
and, therefore, its scalability is also increased.
4.3. Simulation
In the previous section, we have seen analytically that BECSI mechanisms outperform CRL in terms
of Query Cost, WOV and scalability. Moreover, BECSI also improves other revocation mechanisms
such as ADOPT when analyzing the availability of fresh CSI. In this section, we evaluate the proposed
mechanism in a VANET scenario taking into account the specific characteristics of these networks.
Using the simulator NCTUns [31], BECSI is evaluated.
The reference scenario is shown in Fig. 11. This scenario consists of 4 two-lane roads forming a 1000
× 500 m rectangle. Three RSUs are placed every 300 meters. Note that there are some areas of the
highway that are not covered.
Table 2 summarizes the values of the configuration parameters used in the reference scenario. Note that
we have configured our simulation to use the Nakagami propagation model. We choose this propagation
model because empirical research studies have shown that a fading radio propagation model, such as the
Nakagami model, is best for simulation of a vehicular environment [29].
Using this scenario as reference, firstly, we compare the CSI validation delay of the BECSI scheme
with that of the classical PKI [13] under a well-deployed VANET. In the conducted simulation, we
consider the cryptography delay only due to hashing operations and point multiplication operations on
an elliptic curve, as they are the most time-consuming operations in the proposed protocol. Let Thash
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Table 2
Parameter values for the reference scenario
Parameter Value
Area 1000 × 500 m
Number of RSUs 3
Number of OBUs 100
RSU Transmission range 300 m
MAC IEEE 802.11p
Propagation model Nakagami
Number of caching nodes 20
Maximum speed 120 km/h
Fig. 11. Simulation scenario.
and Tmul denote the time required to perform a pairing operation and a point multiplication, respec-
tively, respectively. Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm is the digital signature method chosen by
the VANET standard IEEE1609.2, where a certificate and signature verification takes 4Tmul, and a sig-
nature generation takes Tmul. To verify a credential in the basic scheme described in Section 3.4.4, a
vehicles must perform a hash operation to compute the current contents of leaf node in the BECSI-tree
corresponding to SNi. Finally, it performs logN hash operations to compute the root of the BECSI-tree
using the Path. Therefore, the total computation overhead when checking the status of a certificate is
Thash(logN + 1) + 4Tmul. In [36], Tmul are found for an MNT curve with embedding degree k = 6
that is equal to 0.6 ms. In our simulation, we use an Intel Core i7 950 (at 3.07 GHz) which is able to
perform 1015952 SHA-1 Hashes per second, i.e, Thash = 0, 98μs. Therfore the expected time to check
the validity of a Path in BECSI with is 2.4 ms.
In VANETs, the most important issue in any revocation method is the delay of delivering the CSI to
the vehicles to prevent that misbehaving vehicles from jeopardizing the safety of its neighbors. Conse-
quently, we measure the revocation delay as delay from the moment a vehicle issues a CSI request until
the moment the new CSI is received. Table 3 shows the average time spent by a vehicle to retrieve CSI
from a repository.
It is worth noting that the worst mechanisms in terms of delay are the traditional CRL and delta-CRL
as requesting entities are downloading all the available CSI. However, the delay of the conventional CRL
compared with the proposed BECSI protocol decreases with the number of CSI requests. The variations
in time to download the CRL are due to the number of intermediate RSUs existing in the connection
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Table 3
Time required to retrieve CSI
Revocation mechanism Average Standard
Time Deviation
CRL (300 KB) 2,23 min 0,51 min
Compressed-CRL (20 KB) 7,01 sec 1,12 sec
Traditional Delta CRL (2.5-15 KB) 4,47 sec 2,12 sec
ADOPT (652 B) 705,06 ms 200,81 ms
BECSI Delta CRL (8 KB) 6,02 sec 0,05 sec
BECSI MHT (778 B-912 B) 483,02 ms 20,31 ms
Fig. 12. Histogram plot of the CSI delay depending on the revocation mechanism.
between the CA and the vehicle sending the revocation request. The average time to validate the status
of a certificate in ADOPT is lower than BECSI because of the number of hops that are necessary to
retrieve the cached CSI. BECSI in its MHT mode of operation is the fastest in average when validating
the status of a certificate. However, this mode of operation has a also a notable deviation. While in
ADOPT the high deviation is due to the number of hops, in BECSI this deviation is mainly due to the
number of Δ-trees that a vehicle has to check when a certificate is not revoked. Note also, that there
are also some deviations from the theoretical expected results. This is due to several reasons such as the
non-uniform distribution of the mobile repositories, the distance to the repositories or the congestion of
the channel. Figure 12 shows the number of vehicles that are able to download the CSI in a particular
range time depending on the revocation mechanisms. As expected, with BECSI and ADOPT almost
all the 100 vehicles are able to download and process the CSI in less than 1,5 seconds. However, with
Delta-CRLs and compressed-CRLs it takes from 4 to 8 seconds to retrieve the CSI.
Finally, we also evaluate the overhead introduced by BECSI. BECSI introduces overhead due to the
transmission of the value of the hash chain in the control channel. To evaluate this in the CCH channel,
we configure the RSUs to transmit this message every second. As expected, the vehicle is receiving
messages from the RSU in range every 100 ms; and every second it receives the messageM that involves
an increase of the incoming throughput of 72 bytes. In this sense, the overhead introduced by the BECSI
mechanism is 4% of the toal capacity of the CCH channel.
5. Conclusions
The revocation service is critical to permit efficient authentication in VANETs. Decentralized ap-
proaches based on reputation and voting schemes provide mechanisms for revocation management in-
side the VANET. However, the local validity of the CSI and the lack of support for extending its validity
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to the global VANET restrain their utilization in the real scenarios. The IEEE 1609.2 standard suggest
the use of CRLs to manage the revocation data. However, the tradicional way of issuing CRLs do not fit
well in a VANET where huge number of nodes are involved and where several pseudonym certificates
are assigned in addition to vehicle identity certificates.
In this paper, we have presented BECSI, a bandwidth efficient certificate status checking mechanism
based on the use of a hybrid delta-CRL scheme and MHTs. BECSI introduces an extension to both base-
CRL and delta-CRL allowing any non-TTP to act as repository. The main advantage of this extended-
CRL and extended-delta-CRL is that the road-side units and vehicles can build an efficient structure based
on an authenticated hash tree to respond to status checking requests inside the VANET, saving time and
bandwidth. Thus, vehicles do not have to download the whole CRL but query for the status of the
certificate they need to operate with. Moreover, as extended-delta-CRLs have a fixed size, BECSI avoids
the traditional problem of optimizing the validity windows of delta-CRLs. Thus, the risk of operating
with unknown revoked certificates remains constant during the validity interval of the base-CRL, and
CAs have the ability to manage this risk by setting the size of the delta-CRLs.
Analytical and simulation results show that allocating a small bandwidth is enough to ensure that
vehicles receive CSI responses within few seconds. The performance improvement is obtained at ex-
penses of adding the signed hash tree extension to the standard-CRL. BECSI evaluation shows that not
only improves in terms of bandwidth but also in terms of scalability (increase in the number of avail-
able repositories) and vulnerability (controlled WOV). In this way, BECSI becomes an offline certificate
status validation mechanism as it does not need trusted responders to operate. Therefore, BECSI signif-
icantly achieves great efficiency and scalability, especially when deployed in heterogeneous vehicular
networks.
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